Saturday, July 01, 2006

Payout Policy, Agency Conflicts, and Corporate Governance


KOSE JOHN, New York University - Department of Finance
ANZHELA KNYAZEVA, New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business


Abstract:
This paper examines the role of corporate governance for payout policy design from the perspective of pre-commitment. We test the effect of external and internal corporate governance on the design of payout policy and use of pre-commitment, level and structure of cash distributions, and firm dividend and repurchase behavior.

We argue that firms use pre-commitment to dividend payments to mitigate the agency conflict due to poor governance. We argue that there is an important distinction between dividends and repurchases from the perspective of pre-commitment. Managers that deviate from the chosen dividend policy incur a cost due to a strong negative market response, which reinforces the pre-commitment role of dividends.

See full Abstract.